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Question 
What are the past and current barriers to local financing of infrastructure, with particular attention 
to barriers for local banks and pension funds?  What interventions have been used to resolve 
barriers to finance for infrastructure in Zambia or other sub-Saharan African countries?  To what 
extent has commodity index-linked financing been considered in Zambia (or neighbouring 
countries) as another means of hedging financial exposure to the country’s key economic 
determinant (i.e. copper prices)? 
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1. Overview  
This rapid review of literature identifies constraints and interventions related to financing 
infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa, with particular attention to the role of pension funds in the 
region.  The need for infrastructure development in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa is well-
established in the literature (see, for example, World Bank, 2017; Brookings Institution, 2017; 
Cambridge Economic Policy Associates, 2015) and approaches to financing infrastructure 
investments have received significant attention (for example, Maurer, 2017; World Bank, 2017; 
Essers et al., 2016; Cambridge Economic Policy Associates, 2015; Office of the Special Adviser 
on Africa, 2015).  However, specific discussion of infrastructure and financing in Zambia has 
received limited coverage in publicly-available documents that we were able to find in the time 
available for this report. 
Barriers to local financing of infrastructure are related both to the nature of the projects available 
for investment, which often fail to meet the financing requirements of investors, and to a lack of 
available capital related to financial market conditions (CEPA 2015). The main barriers to 
investment described in the literature (see section 2 below for discussion) are: 
• Lack of project ‘bankability’ 
• Lack of private capital availability 
• Lack of enabling environment 
• Lack of human resource skills (i.e. technical, legal, financial) 
• Length of project development 
• Lack of transparency 
• Regulatory barriers 
• Competition from non-infrastructure projects 
• Aversion to investment in less liquid projects 
• Mismatch between investor desires and financing opportunities 
• Lack of financing vehicles and instruments 
• Limited deal size 
• Perceived and real risk 
• Absence of market for infrastructure assets 
• Sovereign ceiling 
• Currency risks  
For infrastructure investment to be made more attractive to local financiers, the review found that 
the following interventions have been recommended by various academics and practitioners 
(see section 4 below for discussion): 
• Increased capacity to prepare/negotiate/transact projects 
• Need public origination of projects 
• Resource availability at early stage 
• Project development funds (PDFs) 
• PPP framework development 
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• Achieve project ‘bankability’ 
• Mobilise local currency financing 
• Pension sector growth 
• Pension reform 
• Improved governance/regulation 
• Development of domestic financial and capital instruments 
• Partnership development 
• Co-investor encouragement 
• Risk management 
Strength of the evidence base 
With this report’s focus on barriers and constraints to local financing in Zambia and neighbouring 
countries, there are only a limited number of sources available which provide relevant 
information.  There is limited robust evidence in the literature on what has worked previously, 
what may now be done and how it may be carried out. Instead, the emphasis in the literature 
tends to be on the challenges and on recommended or perceived solutions associated with local 
funding of infrastructure. Barriers to local financing in sub-Saharan Africa and in Africa more 
generally have received attention, but there is a paucity of evaluations of interventions. Research 
on the specific barriers and initiatives in Zambia has proved hard to come by.  
In the time available for this review, we were unable to find evidence regarding whether 
commodity index-linked financing had been considered in Zambia or in neighbouring countries as 
a means of hedging financial exposure to the country’s key economic determinant. 
2. Barriers to local financing 
A research programme commissioned by DFID on private finance for infrastructure investment in 
DFID priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), excluding South Africa, reported in 2015 
that the main constraints on the flow of private capital to infrastructure projects are due to either: 
(1) a lack of “bankable1 project opportunities in which projects meet the financing requirements of 
lenders and investors at different points of the project life cycle”, or (2) a lack of “private capital 
from domestic and international credit and capital markets to finance such projects, linked to 
issues in these markets rather than the quality of the available projects (Cambridge Economic 
Policy Associates, 2015, p. 1).  Other barriers are a result of availability of specific sources of 
private finance. For example, “whilst it is possible to raise long term FX bank debt, raising local 
currency denominated or institutional debt finance is more challenging” (CEPA, 2015: p. 4). 
                                                 
 
1 Bankable: Project or proposal that has sufficient collateral, future cashflow, and high probability of success, to 
be acceptable to institutional lenders for financing. Read more: 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/bankable.html 
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Figure 1: Barriers to private financing of infrastructure in DFID focus countries  
 
Source: CEPA (2015) 
In terms of upstream constraints, CEPA (2015, p. 5) suggest that the long-recognised lack of 
an “enabling environment” has been a barrier to PPPs and private investment. However, in the 
context of this constraint, the focus has often been on objective factors such as the lack of 
appropriate legislation and capable institutions. CEPA advises that these problems have certainly 
contributed but that they are amenable to donor interventions. It goes on to state that some of the 
challenges lie even further upstream and involve a lack of recognition of the need to pay for 
infrastructure services and to overcome different interest groups that can work against PPPs 
succeeding. To address these constraints, CEPA recommends a “very high degree of ongoing 
political commitment that can survive political cycles” (2015, p. 5). These political challenges 
require the same level of focus as more technical issues such as developing a legal and 
regulatory framework, project preparation and modes of financing.  
Nevertheless, CEPA suggests that there is now a recognition of what is required to finance long-
needed infrastructure and this is linked to an apparent movement for change (2015, p. 5). It 
asserts that this “may help to overcome the headwinds that PPP approaches have historically 
faced” (2017, p. 5) and cites the success of South Africa’s renewables programme as an 
example to other potential investors of what private finance can achieve.  
Turning to downstream constraints, a public sector partner must either package projects to 
attract private sector interest or else be able to respond to unsolicited approaches (CEPA, 2015, 
p. 5). Downstream constraints “relate to the more objective challenge of improving (the public 
sector partner’s) ability to do so successfully” (CEPA, 2015, p. 5). Findings of research carried 
out by CEPA with private sector and key government stakeholders suggest that they appear to 
have a rather limited interpretation of bankability “in which projects clearing a given financial 
hurdle rate are considered so” (CEPA, 2015, p. 6). Bidders are reported to be looking for a ‘more 
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comprehensive risk mitigation package, which sets out how risks are to be allocated and 
managed, as well as the composition of any required security”.  
CEPA suggests further that the lack of availability of appropriate technical, legal, and financial 
skills, both inside and external to government, to support the necessary processes and activities 
is a key constraint (2017, p. 6). While it recognises that “there are donor-backed transaction 
advisory facilities such as DEVCo, these are typically only available to support the mid and later 
stages of the project development cycle, not its early stages” (CEPA, 2015, p 6).  This results in 
long project delays and significantly higher costs to both the public and private sector, causing 
escalation in the expense of infrastructure provision. notes that it takes an average of seven 
years for projects in Africa to advance through the project development cycle (CEPA, 2015, p. 6). 
CEPA’s research found that a ‘top-down’ approach” to supporting PPPs is frequently used (2015, 
p. 6) and is very resource intensive. There have been efforts to establish PPP nodes in multiple 
ministries, whereas in most countries PPP activity and potential seems highly concentrated (for 
example, in electricity generation). An alternative approach would be to pilot more focused 
approaches restricted to sectors with the greatest immediate potential (CEPA, 2015, p. 6).  
CEPA suggests that “the key challenges remain how to deal objectively and systematically with 
unsolicited approaches, whilst developing capacity in government to originate and progress 
project opportunities. Unsolicited approaches are often opaque arrangements, not least in terms 
of how project rights – often worth millions of dollars – are acquired. This lack of transparency 
makes it more challenging for different DFIs to participate in their financing and for donors to 
provide any required subsidies. This tends to delay project timelines and whereas, at best, the 
approach can produce one-off successes, government-led programmes show the best outcomes 
in terms of volumes of transactions concluded” (CEPA, 2015, p. 6).  According to CEPA’s report 
(2015, p. 6), Africa’s main success stories involve these programmes:  
• Nigeria has attracted a total of US$7.2bn of investment in its ports, since 2005, following 
the ports concession programme. The government has also raised approximately 
US$2.5bn through the sale of electricity assets via two separate programmes and has led 
the way in terms of asset divestment.   
• Kenya’s power utility (KPLC) has gained market credibility through a successful IPP 
programme which has included 10 closed transactions worth nearly US$2.2bn since 
2008.   
• South Africa has recently attracted US$14bn to its renewables programme.  
CEPA (2015, p. 6) links constraints to bank finance to the difficulties facing financial 
institutions, rather than issues related to the projects themselves. Potential issues can be 
“upstream or downstream in nature, including regulatory barriers, human resource-driven 
capacity constraints as well as competition from opportunities other than infrastructure that 
reduce financiers’ interest in infrastructure opportunities” (CEPA, 2015, pp. 6-7).  
CEPA suggests that there are two categories of finance provider: “banking institutions, that is, 
credit markets; and sources of institutional finance, such as pension funds, life assurance funds, 
sovereign wealth investors, and any other institution that invests in financial instruments, such as 
debt and equity, issued by listed and unlisted companies” (2017, p. 7).  It states further that there 
is no evidence that access to long term foreign finance causes a barrier, since many banks in 
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Africa can avail of long term US dollar finance, which is complemented by the considerable 
resources of the DFIs relative to the flow of project opportunities.  
With respect to constraints to institutional investment, CEPA (2017, p. 8) states that local 
institutional investors tend to look to avert equity exposure in infrastructure projects, looking, 
instead, for investments that are more liquid.  
Further, it observes that a “considerable constraint for both local and international debt 
institutional investors is the mismatch between what they are looking for and the project financing 
opportunities on offer” (CEPA, 2017, p. 8). Institutional investors such as pension funds require 
“operational and liquid assets, not greenfield, illiquid ones. This is not just the case in DFID focus 
countries, but also in developed countries. In these countries, most debt institutional investors 
will seek opportunities for investment when a project is refinanced, once construction and other 
implementation risks have been successfully managed. Historically, institutional debt financing of 
greenfield projects was only achieved with the support of monoline credit insurers, most of whom 
have withdrawn from the market following the global financial crisis” (CEPA, 2017, p. 8).  
Another study on private financing completed this year for GIZ similarly identifies a range of 
barriers to infrastructure investment as being either specific to infrastructure as an asset class, or 
more generic for institutional investors or for the target market (Maurer, 2017, p. iii):  
• Lack of appropriate financing vehicles and instruments: large institutional investors 
often require intermediaries to help with due diligence of direct project investments, or 
may operate indirectly through investment funds, although private equity funds typically 
have an investment horizon of 8 to 10 years while infrastructure requires a much longer 
term, and the level and structure of private equity fund management fees often do not fit 
with large and long-term infrastructure financing vehicles (p. 11)   
• Minimum deal size: large global investors are generally interested only in very large-
scale projects, but local institutional investors are normally interested in smaller deal 
sizes (pp. 11, 21-22) 
• A myriad of risks: an information and knowledge gap, related to infrastructure as an 
asset class, creates uncertainty for institutional investors to analyse performance of 
infrastructure investments. This leads to high risk perceptions. (p. 12)  
• Absence of a market for infrastructure assets: in contrast to listed investment 
instruments, it is difficult to reduce or liquidate unlisted infrastructure assets at short 
notice. “There is no secondary market for this emerging asset class. The heterogeneity 
within the infrastructure sector poses a challenge for standardization and benchmarking 
which are important elements for market creation. Overall, this adds a liquidity risk to 
infrastructure investments” (p. 13)    
• Scarcity of well-structured bankable infrastructure projects: sound projects with an 
acceptable risk-return ratio are rare. Preparation and structuring of complex infrastructure 
PPPs can be lengthy and cost and quality of project preparation is often underestimated. 
An illustration of the extreme is the Kigamboni bridge in Tanzania which took 20 years to 
plan, prepare and construct (p. 11)   
• Regulatory barriers and disincentives at global level (Basel III/Solvency II) and in-
country impose restrictions which may have an adverse effect on infrastructure 
7 
investments. Both regulatory frameworks have been criticised for being short-term 
focused and for “forcing financial institutions to rely more on assessments of credit risk by 
private rating agencies, thus, abdicating part of the public regulatory authority in favor of 
private rating agencies” (p. 13). Basel III is a global regulatory framework which requires 
banks to maintain high capital allocation for long-term loans to infrastructure providers. 
“Together with the higher cost of matching long- term assets with liabilities with a similar 
duration, the regulation has greatly dis-incentivised banking sector involvement in 
infrastructure projects. It is likely that banks will become more reluctant to provide project 
loans” (p. 13). A similar effect was feared from the Solvency II regulatory framework on 
pension funds and insurance companies in the European Union that came into effect in 
January 2016. “It follows the principal framework of risk-based capital adequacy with the 
effect of penalizing long-term investments of insurers and pension funds, including 
infrastructure assets. There are concerns that fair value and risk-based regulations for 
institutional investors could lead to further de-risking and pro-cyclicality, and may also be 
detrimental to substantially increasing infrastructure and other long-term investment 
strategies” (p. 13)  
• Sovereign ceiling: the credit rating for an individual project or firm cannot exceed that of 
the country where it is located. This “rule effectively closes the door for debt financing in 
African countries, with very few exceptions, by global institutional investors”. (p. iii). 
• Currency risks weigh heavily on long-term financing: “cross-border long-term financing – 
albeit on concessional terms – can be very costly for recipient countries due to currency 
devaluations over the long run” (p. iii). 
Maurer particularly points out that the sovereign ceiling and currency risk do not significantly 
affect domestic institutional investors, which points to significant potential for such investors 
(p. iii).   
3. Pension funds as investors in infrastructure 
There is “surprisingly little collective and well-collated information on the African pensions 
industry” (The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2014, p. 3), although there is some evidence that 
local banks and pension funds may be potential sources of infrastructure funding.  
Recent reforms in many African countries have created private pension systems which are 
rapidly accumulating assets. The Nigerian pension industry grew from US$7 billion to $25 billion 
from 2008 to 2013; Ghana’s pension industry is expected to expand by up to 400 per cent from 
2014 to 2018; pension assets equate to approximately 80 per cent of GDP in Namibia and 40 per 
cent in Botswana (Commonwealth Secretariat 2014, p. 3).  
Observers suggest that pension funds offer significant potential as a source of funds for 
investment.  The Commonwealth Secretariat, for example (2014, p. 3) suggests that “pension 
funds play a critical role in finance through the mobilisation and allocation of stable long-term 
savings to support investment”.  The Brookings Institution (2017, p. 5) argues that there is an 
“urgency to act now if the significant potential of African pensions to finance infrastructure 
development is to be leveraged” with sub-Saharan African countries being “in a ‘demographic 
sweet spot’ as dependency ratios are low, the labour force is growing rapidly, and the impact of 
aging has not yet hit their pension systems”, and suggests that policymakers need to address 
existing obstacles to pension funds investment in infrastructure. 
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However, pension funds have been underutilised for investment in infrastructure in Africa 
(Brookings Institution, 2017, foreword). The Brookings Institution cautions that pension assets as 
a share of GDP are low because “pension funds are relatively small and dominated by often 
poorly performing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes for public sector employees. Even when 
pension reform has been implemented, as in Nigeria, and assets are available for investment, 
governance and regulatory obstacles as well as a dearth of adequate financial instruments limit 
pension funds’ allocation to infrastructure” (2017, pp. 5-6).   
The Brookings Institution (2017) describes a dichotomy where some pension funds may be too 
risk averse to invest in risky, decades-long infrastructure projects, while others contend that with 
the right governance, regulation, and instruments to assess and manage risks associated with 
long-term investment in infrastructure, pension funds could play a key in transforming the 
continent’s infrastructure landscape.  Until recently, African pension funds were cautious of 
investing in long-term infrastructure projects such as roads, rail and ports (Maurer, 2017, p. ii). 
Nevertheless, the experience of global and South African pension funds investing in alternative 
asset markets has attracted the interest of local pension funds and regulators (Maurer 2017, p. ii)   
To enable further local pension fund activity in financing infrastructure, the Brookings Institution 
(2017) suggests that the following initiatives are needed: 
• Pension reform driven by strong political leadership and ownership by all stakeholders 
can help improve the performance of African pension systems and develop pension 
assets. However, pension reform should be carefully designed so as to learn from the 
lessons of the mixed results of earlier experiences in Latin America, notably in Chile, as 
well as in Central and Eastern European countries.  
• Improvements to the governance, regulation, and supervision of pension funds can help 
pension funds invest in infrastructure in a manner consistent with their primary goal of 
ensuring old-age income security.  
• Even when sufficient pension assets are available and asset allocation to infrastructure 
investments is made, African countries will still need to develop domestic financial and 
capital market instruments for infrastructure investment.  
• Given the large scale of infrastructure investment, African countries will need to consider 
the net benefits of complementing domestic pension assets with foreign and multilateral 
investments through co-financing and innovative policies. 
Cambridge Economic Policy Associates (2015, p. 12) suggest that pension funds find operational 
and liquid assets more attractive than greenfield, illiquid ones. Notwithstanding this, CEPA goes 
on to report that there has been a gradual movement in asset allocation to riskier asset classes 
and to alternative investments (including infrastructure) which may be less liquid but offer higher 
returns. For example, in 2013, Wentworth reported that South Africa, Namibia and Botswana had 
employed pension funds in buying infrastructure bonds: “The Botswana Public Officers Pension 
Fund is in the process of diversifying 14% of its portfolio to alternative assets in property, private 
equity, hedge funds and infrastructure. Namibian pension funds have bought Zambian 
infrastructure project bonds. South Africa’s Government Employees Pension Fund bought $595 
million in the Industrial Development Corporation’s ‘green bond’ issue, aimed at funding 
renewable energy. Other pension funds held by South Africa’s Old Mutual and Sanlam have 
invested in toll roads and energy projects”. (Wentworth, 2013). Some countries are passing new 
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regulations to allow investment into private equity, and several African pension funds have 
started to invest in private equity (Maurer, 2017, p. ii). 
Global institutional investors are showing an increased interest in African infrastructure 
investments (Maurer, 2017). For example, there have been investments in infrastructure funds 
dedicated to Africa or global funds with an Africa window. A large proportion of these (87%) have 
been in the form of private equity. Australian and Canadian pension funds have been at the 
forefront in global infrastructure investments with allocations of 10% and 15% of total assets 
respectively (Maurer, 2017, p. iii). 
NEPAD (2013) provides a useful overview of the main public sector funds and pension schemes 
in Zambia: the National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA) which consolidated several public 
schemes in 2000, the Public Service Pension Fund, the Local Authority Superannuation Fund, as 
well as significant private pension schemes. The defined contribution schemes require employer 
contributions, and the largest private schemes are African Life Assurance (AfLife), part of the 
Sanlam Group and Madison. Pension funds are growing annually and there are planned reforms 
to increase contributions.  
Zambia issued a successful Eurobond in September 2012, the proceeds of which were to be 
used in the roads and energy sectors. The total net issuance amount of USD734 million was 
distributed between USD 500m in the 2012 budget for roads and energy; and USD 234m in the 
2013 budget. The Kafue Gorge Lower Project was estimated to cost USD 2bn, requiring USD 
600m in equity, of which the government had allocated ZESCO USD 200m for their share of the 
joint venture with Chinese companies (NEPAD, 2013).  
However, the private capital market has largely been absent in relation to infrastructure financing. 
Information and awareness of capital markets is described as lacking and no high-quality issuer 
has accessed the market directly. Family firms are deterred by disclosure requirements, fees and 
general market awareness. There is also a lack of intermediation in Zambia, with few investment 
banking operations looking to push innovation in the local capital market (NEPAD, 2013, p. 180).  
Given the Government’s fiscal constraints, ZESCO (Zambia’s corporatized power utility) has 
been looking for joint ventures with Chinese, Indian and Western investors to fund their USD 
5.3bn project pipeline (NEPAD, 2013, p. 180). NEPAD indicates further that “banks extend credit 
secured by revenues from mining clients. Other parastatal issuers may include the Roads 
Development Agency, who will consider ring-fencing cash-flows to assist in raising funds. In 
addition, Zambian municipalities such as Lusaka, Solwezi and Livingstone are also looking at 
local and international bond markets” (pp. 180-181).  
In addition, ZESCO has been “following a diversified strategy to increase power generating 
capacity in the country, including project finance in which they are a joint venture partner with an 
external party. They are a 50-50 shareholder in the Itezhi-Tezhi hydropower project and are 
following a similar approach with projects such as Batoka Gorge” (p. 198).  
4. Interventions to enable local financing 
The literature describes a number of ways in which local financing of infrastructure may be 
enabled. However, most available literature tends to either make recommendations or to 
describe initiatives and their objectives, but does not provide details of how initiatives are put into 
operation in practice or provide evidence of actual outcomes.  
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CEPA (2015, 8) reports on policy options to attract private finance to infrastructure programmes 
that have worked in countries such as South Africa and India (Figure 2).  CEPA recommends 
that resource flows from donors, and government budgets to develop capacity to prepare, 
negotiate, and transact projects, need to be increased (p. 10). It suggests that “more public 
origination not only of projects, but of PPP programmes” is needed and that there needs to be an 
attendant increase in project preparation resources with early stage support being critical: “most 
support from global facilities is only available once a project is developed to at least the pre-
feasibility stage.
 
This is a considerable gap given typical line ministries have limited experience 
of identifying potential PPP opportunities and undertaking initial analysis. For example, the 
Kenyan PPP unit has had to reject many proposals from line ministries for support to develop 
opportunities as they lack an understanding of what is required” (2017, p. 8).  
Figure 2: Potential policy options to increase private finance to infrastructure in DFID 
focus countries 
 
Source: CEPA (2015) 
Reflecting on experience in South Asia, CEPA (2015) states that, in terms of downstream 
support, “different forms of Project Development Funds (PDFs) appear to offer the most 
potential to support the development, packaging and transacting of projects” (p. 8). Success fees 
should be charged to projects that reach financial close, with the PDF being reimbursed so that it 
can be “at least partially revolving” (p. 8). It is important that a combination of a PDF and any 
success fees allow for the procurement of appropriately skilled advisors.
 
 
In addition, PPP frameworks need to be developed so as to provide approaches for dealing with 
unsolicited proposals and for donor-backed developer approaches which can bring innovation 
and risk capital to PPP (CEPA, 2015, p. 10).  
NEPAD reports that Zambia has an evolving PPP program, with associated law passed in 2009 
(2013, p. 198). There is a special unit that reports to the Ministry of Finance which is in the 
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process of establishing PPP focal points in all line ministries. The rail sector is a key priority 
because of the strain that the mining sector is putting on roads in the Copperbelt. There is also a 
USD 200m project to connect TA-ZARA Railway with Angola (p. 198) 
Achieving bankability  
The evidence suggests that “the vast majority of greenfield PPPs that have successfully raised 
commercial bank finance, have done so with the support of partial risk guarantees (PRGs) 
provided by the main MDBs. Similar support can also be sought from export credit agencies 
(ECA) from an investor’s country of origin. For instance, outside of South Africa, Kenya and 
Nigeria have the highest levels of private investment in their power sectors – as such, they can 
be seen as being at the frontier of private financing. In Kenya, five out of seven IPPs closed in 
the period 2010-15 have required PRG support across a range of government commitments.
 
In 
Nigeria, four out of four projects have also required PRG support” (CEPA, 2015, p. 10-11).  
PRGs allow allocation of different risks to different stakeholders. For example, commercial 
performance risks can be transferred to the private sector, whereas governments are required to 
stand behind their own obligations, such as the responsibility of state-owned off-takers to pay for 
contracted services (CEPA, 2015, p. 11). 
Mobilising local currency financing  
The most obvious way to increase the participation of local institutional investment in equity is 
through the traded equity of private sector and state-owned companies (CEPA, 2015, p. 12).  
Raising local currency debt financing is challenging because of the greater supply side 
constraints, relative to FX financing. Notwithstanding this, “even its partial provision within a 
financing structure can form a natural hedge against the exchange rate depreciation risk 
associated with the accompanying FX debt financing in the structure. Therefore the objectives of 
an intervention to promote local currency financing are twofold: first, to improve the ability of 
projects to manage exchange rate risks; and second, to increase the range of opportunities open 
to local lenders and investors” (p. 12).  
CEPA (2015, p. 12) notes that, unlike “international institutional debt, which requires a large 
investment and investment grade credit ratings, local currency institutional debt investment 
typically requires neither. However, local currency institutional debt has specific additional non-
credit requirements, which need to be addressed if it is to be mobilised. The first of these is the 
fact that local currency debt will be more expensive than FX as its pricing is driven by local 
interest rates, which will typically be higher than FX (especially given the current historically low 
interest rates in most OECD economies). Charges for infrastructure services need to reflect 
these additional costs. Second, institutional investors will want to be in a position where they can 
sell down their positions at short notice in the event that they need cash. The best way to achieve 
this is for the debt to be publicly listed”.  
In their summary of ways forward for African governments to use infrastructure project bonds, 
NEPAD (2013, p. 25) suggests that a number of initiatives are needed. With respect to pension 
funds, there is a requirement to continue progress on pension-sector growth, including 
mandatory employee/employer contribution, tax incentives, and professional asset management. 
In addition, they suggest that independent regulators who permit holding of infrastructure assets 
need to be established. With reference to infrastructure itself, NEPAD states that “corporatization 
and professional management of utilities and parastatals  in order to prepare them for primary 
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bond market issuance and to provide bankable off-take agreements for private-sector projects” 
(p. 25) are necessary. This should be backed by:  
• encouragement of issuance to finance investment programs.   
• a transparent, rules-based regulatory environment including licensing for IPPs, PPP grid 
access and tariff setting. Establishment of laws and institutions with strong political 
support to ensure projects are ready for market.   
• ensuring IPPs, PPPs and private projects share currency risk to incentivize local market 
borrowing. This will also limit the currency exposure of utilities.   
• promoting projects with structures that remove demand or market risks so more 
acceptable to bond investors. Consider partial guarantees to improve bankability. Raise 
capital for possible co-investment in local bond markets.   
For Maurer (2017, p. iii), a number of initiatives are under way to address some of the 
infrastructure funding constraints. He suggests, though, that there is a need “to enable, motivate 
and incentivize institutional investors to make “baby steps” toward infrastructure finance in 
Africa”. (pp. v-vi) and that some investment barriers are “persistent and call for amenable 
solutions and external support” (p. iii).  
Maurer highlights that although numerous project preparation facilities have been set up by 
development organizations for building pipelines of bankable projects, some at the regional but 
most of them at the global level, their impact has been modest thus far.  Donors and DFIs have 
launched infrastructure funds and co-investment platforms (for example, the Africa50 
Infrastructure Fund2 created by the AfDB and the Managed Co-lending Portfolio Program 
(MCPP)3 launched by the IFC.  However, Maurer (2017) contends that there is still a need for 
innovative financing vehicles and instruments that match institutional investors’ needs and 
preferences, are aligned with their risk-return profiles and that can unlock institutional capital on a 
large scale, especially debt financing.  According to Maurer, regulatory barriers are only partly 
being addressed. He suggests that Basel III4 penalizes long-term bank lending for infrastructure. 
The same is true for European pension funds and insurers under Solvency II5 but consultations 
are under way for a recalibration of the framework.   
                                                 
 
2 The Africa50 Infrastructure Fund’s mission is to mobilize long term savings from within and outside Africa and 
private sector funding to promote infrastructure development in Africa (https://www.africa50.com). 
 
3 MCPP is a new International Finance Corporation (IFC) Syndications product that allows institutional investors 
the opportunity to passively participate in IFC’s future loan portfolio. 
(http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+Syndications/Overv
iew_Benefits_Structure/Managed+Co-Lending+Portfolio+Program/) 
 
4 Basel III is a comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector. The measures 
aim to improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, improve 
risk management and governance and strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures (Bank for International 
Settlements: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm). 
5 Solvency II is a new set of rules governing how banks are funded and their governance. Under these rules,  
insurers will need enough capital to have 99.5 per cent confidence they could cope with the worst expected 
losses over a year. The rules take a risk-based approach to regulation: the riskier an insurer’s business, the more 
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Maurer argues that partnerships and co-investments in infrastructure could be promoted: “Co-
investment platforms are important catalysts for crowding-in institutional investors. By pooling 
their resources, institutional investors can leverage their cumulative risk appetite and invest in a 
variety of deals, diversifying their infrastructure portfolio and potentially gaining a better, more 
stable longer-term return than would be possible if investors were to invest in deals by 
themselves. Having DFIs as co-investors provides reassurance to institutional investors and also 
helps to gain access to prospective investment opportunities. It is recommended to utilize the 
existing co-investment platforms and to replicate such platforms for other infrastructure 
investments, as appropriate…Peer-to-peer exchange and peer learning can be very effective 
tools to promote infrastructure finance, both among pension funds and pension regulators. The 
different levels of development of pension systems in Africa provide a useful context for 
exchange of knowledge and expertise amongst industry participants across the continent” (2017, 
p. v).  
The multiple risks in infrastructure finance require a comprehensive risk management approach. 
Some risks can be managed internally, others may require external risk mitigation support from 
donors and DFIs (2017, p. iii).  This is especially relevant for debt financing; Maurer (2017, p. v) 
suggests that “risk mitigation can – to a considerable extent - be achieved standalone through 
innovative finance structures and financial engineering techniques. To some extent, however, it 
requires external enhancement support from government, donors or DFIs to make project debt 
issues attractive to investors”. Maurer recommends that innovative finance structures be 
developed and proven financial engineering techniques for risk mitigation be applied, including:  
• Unbundling of infrastructure projects into components with different risk-return profiles 
and creating component-specific financial products   
• Pooling of multiple infrastructure projects with different risk-return profiles into a single 
portfolio, thereby enhancing diversification   
• Credit enhancement through risk tranching and subordination or donors to provide 
external credit enhancement via first-loss tranches as effective instruments for aligning 
risk and return profiles for institutional investors.   
5. References  
Adams, P. (2015). Africa debt rising. Africa Research Institute. 
https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/publications/africa-debt-rising-2/ 
Briceño-Garmendia, C., Smits, K. & Foster, V. (2008). Financing public infrastructure in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Patterns & emerging issues. Background Paper 15. African Infrastructure 
Country Diagnostic.  World Bank. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/936101468211804244/pdf/718150WP0v10P10Fiscal
0costs0maintxt.pdf 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
precautions it is required to take. (Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/51bc0c08-aa38-11e5-9700-
2b669a5aeb83) 
 
 
14 
Brookings Institution (2017). Leveraging African pension funds for financing infrastructure 
development. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/global_20170314_african-
pension-funds.pdf 
Cambridge Economic Policy Associates (2015). Mobilising finance for infrastructure: A study for 
the Department of International Development. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a0897fe5274a31e00000e8/61319-
DfID_1_Synthesis_Report_Final.pdf 
Commonwealth Secretariat (2014). Pension funds and private equity: Unlocking African potential. 
http://empea.org/_files/listing_pages/Pension_Funds_and_Private_Equity_Unlocking_Africas_Po
tential_2014_Final.pdf 
Essers, D., Blommestein, H., Cassimon, D. & Flores, P. (2016). Local currency bond market 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A stock-taking exercise & analysis of key drivers. Emerging 
Markets Finance and Trade, Vol. 52: 1167-1194. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1540496X.2015.1073987?journalCode=mree20 
Foster, V. & Briceño-Garmedia, C. (2010). Africa's Infrastructure : A Time for 
Transformation. Africa Development Forum. World Bank 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2692 
Gravito, L., Alli, A., Haddin, J. & Usanase, A. (2017). Infrastructure financing in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Best practices from ten years in the field. Boston Consulting Group. 
http://www.africafc.org/Publications/Publications-Documents/BCG-Report-Africa-May-2017-
Electronic-v12-may.aspx 
Maurer, K. (2017). Mobilization of long-term savings for infrastructure financing in Africa. Study 
prepared for German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 
https://www.bmz.de/en/zentrales_downloadarchiv/wege_und_akteure/170419_Study_Infrastruct
ure_Finance_Africa_fin.pdf 
NEPAD (2013). Structure finance: conditions for infrastructure project bonds in African Markets. 
NEPAD Regional Integration and Trade Department. African Development Bank. 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-
Operations/Structured_Finance_-
_Conditions_for_Infrastructure_Project_Bonds_in_African_Markets.pdf 
New Climate Economy (2016). A roadmap for financing sustainable infrastructure. The 
Sustainable Infrastructure Imperative. http://newclimateeconomy.report/2016/a-roadmap-for-
financing-sustainable-infrastructure/ 
Office of the Special Adviser in Africa (2015). Financing Africa’s infrastructure development. 
Policy Brief. http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/policybriefs/2015_financing_infrastructure.pdf 
Pearson, M. (2013). Financing infrastructure through innovative strategies in Africa. GREAT 
insights, Vol. 2 (4), May-June 2013). Maastrict: ECDPM. http://ecdpm.org/great-
insights/financing-infrastructure/financing-infrastructure-innovative-strategies-africa/ 
Tandi, N. & Earle, A. (nd). Financing water infrastructure in Africa. Working paper 24. Stockholm 
International Water Institute. http://www.siwi.org/publications/financing-water-infrastructure-in-
africa/ 
15 
Wentworth, L. (2013). Financing of Infrastructure. PERISA Case Study 2 Infrastructure. SAIIA 
ECDPM. http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013-PERISA-CaseStudy2-Financing-of-
Infrastructure.pdf 
World Bank (2017). Africa’s Pulse: An analysis of issues shaping Africa’s economic future. April 
2017.Vol. 15. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/26485 
 
Suggested citation 
Rajé, F. (2017). Local financing for infrastructure in Zambia. K4D Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK: 
Institute of Development Studies. 
About this report 
This report is based on ten days of desk-based research. The K4D research helpdesk provides rapid syntheses 
of a selection of recent relevant literature and international expert thinking in response to specific questions 
relating to international development. For any enquiries, contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
K4D services are provided by a consortium of leading organisations working in international development, led by 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), with Education Development Trust, Itad, University of Leeds Nuffield 
Centre for International Health and Development, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM), University of 
Birmingham International Development Department (IDD) and the University of Manchester Humanitarian and 
Conflict Response Institute (HCRI). 
This report was prepared for the UK Government’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and its partners in support of pro-poor programmes. It is licensed for 
non-commercial purposes only. K4D cannot be held responsible for errors or any 
consequences arising from the use of information contained in this report. Any views and 
opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, K4D or any other contributing 
organisation. © DFID - Crown copyright 2017. 
